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We characterize optimal taxation of foreign capital and optimal sovereign debt policy in a small open
economy where the government cannot commit to policy and seeks to insure a risk averse domestic
constituency.  The expected tax on capital is shown to vary with the state of the economy, generating
cyclicality in investment and debt in an environment where the first best capital stock is a constant.
The government's lack of commitment induces a negative correlation between investment and the
stock of government debt, a "debt overhang'' effect.  If the government discounts the future at a rate
higher than the market, then capital oscillates indefinitely at a level strictly below the first best.  Debt
relief is never Pareto improving and cannot affect the long-run level of investment.  Further, restricting






















We study optimal taxation of foreign capital and optimal sovereign debt policy in a small
open economy (SOE) where the government cannot commit to policy and seeks to insure
a risk averse domestic constituency. The environment we consider includes two deﬁning
features of emerging markets, namely a lack of access to ﬁnancial markets on the part of
domestic agents and the inability of the government to commit to policy. We show that even
when the government is benevolent, the expected tax on capital endogenously varies with
the state of the economy and investment is distorted by more in recessions than in booms,
generating cyclicality in investment and debt in an environment where the ﬁrst best capital
stock is a constant. The government’s lack of commitment induces a negative correlation
between investment and the stock of government debt, generating a “debt overhang” eﬀect.
We show that if the government discounts the future at a rate higher than the world
interest rate, then investment and the level of debt oscillates indeﬁnitely. Investment remains
strictly below the ﬁrst best level even in the long run. Further, we show that imposing a
balanced budget on the government may eliminate the ampliﬁcation of shocks. That is, the
government’s access to international debt markets generates the volatility of capital.
In the model, the government implements ﬁscal policy on behalf of risk averse domestic
agents (or a preferred sub-set of agents) who lack access to ﬁnancial markets and do not
own capital. Uncertainty is driven by an i.i.d. stochastic productivity process. The shock
can be interpreted as a productivity shock or a terms of trade shock. This generates a
risk that the domestic agents cannot insure. Risk neutral foreigners invest capital that is
immobile for one period and has an opportunity cost given by the world interest rate. The
government provides insurance to domestic agents by taxing or subsidizing foreign capitalists
and trading a non-contingent bond with international ﬁnancial markets. Since the expected
marginal product of capital is independent of the shock’s realization, the ﬁrst-best capital
stock is acyclical. This environment allows us to isolate the role of ﬁscal policy in generating
investment and debt cycles.
If the government could commit, optimal ﬁscal policy (the Ramsey solution) does not
distort capital in this economy (similar to Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986)). The combi-
nation of state contingent taxes and the bond is equivalent to the government having access
to a complete set of state-contingent assets, as in Zhu (1992), Judd (1992) and Chari et
al. (1994). Under commitment, full insurance is achieved while maintaining an expected
foreign tax of zero. The government exploits the fact that capital is ex post inelastic and
the risk-neutrality of foreign capitalists to transfer capital income across states. The ex ante
elasticity of capital provides the necessary incentive to keep average tax payments at zero.
2The result that there is no distortion of capital holds regardless of the government’s discount
rate as long as the government can commit.
What if the government cannot commit to its promised tax and debt plan? While the
sunk nature of capital allows the government to insure domestic agents, it also tempts the
government to renege on tax promises ex post. Similarly, a government may wish to default
on its outstanding debt obligations. We show that the optimal taxation problem can be
written as a constrained eﬃcient contract between a risk-neutral foreigner (who can commit)
and the government (who cannot commit). An eﬃcient allocation is sustained by prescribing
that if the government deviates on its tax policy or defaults on its debt obligations, foreign
investment will drop to zero, and the country will remain in ﬁnancial autarky thereafter.
An important feature of the optimal program is that when the government’s participation
constraints bind, capital following high income shocks is strictly greater than capital follow-
ing low shocks, despite the shocks being i.i.d.. This cyclical variation in investment arises
due to sovereign debt. The strongest temptation to deviate from the optimal plan arises
after receiving the highest income shock. An optimal contract then accommodates such
temptation by prescribing higher domestic consumption. However, consumption smoothing
implies that it is optimal to increase future domestic consumption as well, a result that is
achieved through a reduction in the stock of sovereign debt. A lower stock of debt relaxes
subsequent participation constraints, allowing higher investment.
We show that if the government discounts at the market interest rate, then the economy
asymptotes towards the ﬁrst best level of capital and there is no ampliﬁcation in the long-
run. This result is as in Thomas and Worrall (1994) and Alburquerque and Hopenhayn
(2004). We show as well that if instead the government discounts the future at a higher rate
than the market, then capital converges to a unique, non-degenerate stationary distribution
whose support lies strictly below the ﬁrst best. Moreover, in the stationary distribution,
capital is greater and debt lower following a higher shock. The model naturally generates
investment and borrowing cycles whereby lower investment periods are preceded by higher
levels of indebtedness.
To clarify the role of access to the sovereign debt markets in generating the investment
cycles, we analyze the situation where the government is forced to run a balanced budget, and
therefore cannot transfer resources across periods. In this case, distortions to investment will
be independent of the current shock in an i.i.d. environment. Investment may be distorted,
but will be constant. Further, for a discount factor lower than the market rate, it can be
the case that under a balanced budget rule investment is undistorted and consumption is
constant. Hence, the government’s access to debt markets can increase the volatility of
consumption and the distortion of investment.
3Political economy frictions in developing economies are introduced in the model, albeit
simplistically, by the higher discount rate of the government with respect to the domestic
agents. In this case, the government will over-borrow, trading away future stability for
increased current consumption. This provides a rationale for imposing a debt constraint on
the government. These type of considerations have led countries such as Chile and Brazil
to place budgetary restrictions on their governments. Our analysis highlights not only the
circumstances under which such restrictions can be welfare improving, but also the expected
eﬀects on output volatility and investment patterns. Clearly, under a benevolent government
such access to ﬁnancial markets is always welfare improving.
The predictions of the model are reminiscent of emerging market crises. As predicted
by the model, governments often allow foreign capital to earn large returns in booms but
conﬁscate capital income during crises. Moreover, as documented by Calvo et al. (2005),
investment remains persistently depressed following a crisis. The most recent crisis in Ar-
gentina in January 2002 is a dramatic illustration of this phenomenon. Measures of expro-
priation risk for Argentina as calculated by the Heritage Foundation and Fraser Institute
deteriorated sharply. A similar deterioration of property rights is observed in other emerg-
ing market crises, often precipitated by a terms of trade shock or other exogenous drop in
income. The oscillation between pro-growth policies and populism observed in many devel-
oping economies seems to contribute to (rather than stabilize) the volatility of output. Our
paper rationalizes such behavior.
The model is also consistent with the well known debt overhang eﬀect on investment
in less developed countries. This negative eﬀect of accumulated debt on investment has
been widely explored starting with the work of Sachs (1989) and Krugman (1988). In these
papers, investment by domestic agents is distorted because foreign creditors have claims
on the additional output resulting from investment. The level of debt is assumed to be
exogenous and debt relief is shown to enhance investment and in some cases to generate
a Pareto improvement. Diﬀerently, in our model, such cyclical debt overhang eﬀects arise
endogenously due to the limited ability of the government to commit. However, at all times
the optimal allocation generates payoﬀs on the Pareto frontier, and hence debt relief, while
beneﬁting the government, can never generate a Pareto improvement. Furthermore, the
existence of a unique long run distribution implies that debt relief programs will at most
have short-lived eﬀects.
41.1 Related Literature
This paper builds on the inﬂuential paper of Thomas and Worrall (1994), who introduce a
model of foreign direct investment in an environment of limited commitment. Alburquerque
and Hopenhayn (2004) develop a related model. Our analysis diﬀers from these papers in
several important respects. The ﬁrst is that we analyze the case of an impatient govern-
ment, which has dramatically diﬀerent long run properties. Given the political economy
of emerging markets, the case of an impatient government is an important generalization.
Secondly, we consider more general production functions and derive our results under weaker
assumptions. Lastly, we consider how the imposition of a balanced budget requirement on
the host government alters the cyclicality of investment and consumption.
There is also a large literature on the question of optimal taxation by a benevolent social
planner. See the survey by Chari and Kehoe (1999) and the references therein. Several papers
have studied optimal ﬁscal policy without commitment. In a paper related to ours, Benhabib
and Velasco (1996) study an open economy where the government lacks commitment and
needs to ﬁnance productive investment. Their paper diﬀers from ours by considering a
deterministic economy. Therefore, there is no scope for ﬁscal policy to vary with shocks or
to provide insurance. Our paper is also related to Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), where a
policy game is analyzed for the case without uncertainty in a closed economy.
In an important paper in the international business cycle literature, Kehoe and Perri
(2002) consider a model of risk sharing across two countries with limited commitment. Dif-
ferently from them, we study a small open economy and emphasize the role of the government
in generating ampliﬁcation. Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Lane and Tornell (1999) present
interesting political economy games in which a “tragedy of the commons” problem arises
that may distort investment. However, these papers restrict attention to Markov equilibria,
and therefore the issue of state dependent “reputation” does not arise.
Our results also relate to the “debt overhang” literature, in which outstanding debt
inﬂuences borrowing for new investment projects (see, for example, Krugman (1988) and
Cohen and Sachs (1986)). See Kovrijnykh and Szentes (2006) and Arslanalp and Henry
(2006) for a recent discussion of this literature. Unlike our model, Kovrijnykh and Szentes
(2006) present a model of strategic lending and focus on Markov equilibria.
The primary empirical study of emerging markets ﬁscal policy are Gavin and Perotti
(1997) and Kaminksy et al. (2004). They focus on the spending side (see also Talvi and
Vegh (2004)) and document that emerging markets follow ﬁscal policies that are more pro-
cyclical than those in developed economies. While the quarterly cyclicality of government
expenditures is an important issue, our focus is on the expropriation of foreign capital during
crises.
5The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model environment; Section 3
characterizes the optimal policy under full commitment; Section 4 characterizes the optimal
policy under limited commitment; Section 5 restricts the government to a balanced budget;
and Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains all proofs.
2 Environment
Time is discrete and runs to inﬁnity. The economy is composed of a government and two
types of agents: domestic agents and foreign capitalists. Domestic agents (or “workers”) are
risk averse and supply inelastically l units of labor every period for a wage w. Variables will
be expressed in per capita units.
The economy receives a shock z every period. One can interpret the shock as a terms
of trade shock to a developing country’s exports or a productivity shock. The assumptions
underlying the shock process are described below.
Assumption 1. The shock z follows an i.i.d. process and the realizations of z lie in a ﬁnite
set Z ⊂ ℜ. Let the highest element of Z be ¯ z and the lowest element be z. Let q(z) denote
the associated probability of state z.
Let zt = {z0,z1,...zt} be a history of shocks up to time t. Denote by q (zt) the probability
that zt occurs.














where c(zt) is their consumption in history zt and U is a standard utility function deﬁned over
non-negative consumption satisfying Inada conditions with U′ > 0,U′′ < 0. Let Umin ≡ U(0).
The parameter ˆ β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. The “hat” notation on the discount rate
allows us to diﬀerentiate the workers’ and government’s patience.
Assumption 2 (Segmented Capital Markets). Workers do not have access to ﬁnancial














where T (zt) are transfers received from the government at history zt and w(zt) is the com-
petitive wage at history zt.
6As we will see below, we allow the government to borrow and lend from foreigners on
behalf of workers, albeit perhaps not optimally from their perspective. If the government
implements the workers’ optimal plan, workers and the government can be considered a
single entity. The expositional advantage of separating workers from the government is that
in practice it is the government that can tax capital and not individual workers. Moreover,
the government may not implement the workers’ optimal plan. Note that the workers have
a trivial decision problem, so we focus attention on the government’s problem introduced
below.
There exists a continuum of risk-neutral foreign capitalists who supply capital, but no
labor. The foreign capitalists own competitive domestic ﬁrms that produce by hiring domes-
tic labor and using foreign capital. The production function f is of the standard neoclassical
form:
y = f (z,k,l),
where f is constant returns to scale with fk > 0, fkk < 0 and satisfying Inada conditions.
Without loss of generality, we assume that f(z,k,l) is strictly increasing in z.
The capitalists have access to ﬁnancial markets. We assume a small open economy where
the capitalists face the exogenous world interest rate of r∗. Capital is installed before the
shock and tax rate are realized and cannot be moved until the end of the period. We
denote by k(zt−1) the capital installed at the end of period t − 1 to be used at time t. The



















We make the following assumption about the government’s objective function:
Assumption 3 (Government’s Objective). The government’s objective function is to max-














A benevolent government is the case that β = ˆ β. An interesting alternative is the case β < ˆ β,
that is, the government is more impatient than domestic agents. This may be interpreted as
a reduced form of a political economy model in which the possibility of losing oﬃce makes
the government discount the future at a greater rate (see, for example, Amador (2004)).
Similarly, we could assume that the government maximizes the utility of a subset of agents,
7such as political insiders or public employees. The analysis will make clear that our results
extend to these alternative objective functions as long as the favored agents are risk averse
and lack access to capital markets.
The government receives an endowment income each period g(z), where g is non-negative
and strictly increasing in z. This captures, for example, returns to a natural resource endow-
ment sold on the world market. The government also taxes capital proﬁts at a linear rate
τ (zt) and transfers the proceeds to the workers T (zt). For the benchmark model, we assume
the government can trade a non-contingent bond with the international ﬁnancial markets.
Let b(zt) denote the outstanding debt of the government borrowed at history zt and due the
















+ (1 + r
∗)b(z
t−1).
Taking as given a tax rate plan τ (zt), ﬁrms maximize after-tax proﬁts net of depreciation


















































where fi denotes the partial derivative of f with respect to i = k,l.
According to equation (2), the expected return to capitalists from investing in the do-
mestic economy net of depreciation should equal the world interest rate r∗. Given the i.i.d.
assumption regarding the shocks, optimal capital is a constant in a world without taxes. We
denote this ﬁrst best level of capital by k∗; so that E[fk(z,k∗,l)] = r∗ + δ.
3 Optimal Taxation under Commitment
Before we proceed to the analysis with limited commitment, as a useful comparison we
characterize the optimal ﬁscal policy under commitment. We show that tax policy is not
8distortionary and that investment will be constant at the ﬁrst-best level k⋆.
Suppose that the government can commit at time 0 to a tax policy τ(zt) and debt pay-
ments (1+r∗)b(zt) for every possible history of shocks zt. This “Ramsey” plan is announced
before the initial capital stock is invested. Given some initial debt, b(−1), the government






































































Deﬁne the total output of the economy as F(z,k,l):
F(z,k,l) ≡ f(z,k,l) + g(z). (8)

































+ (1 + r
∗)b(z
t−1). (9)
We have used the constant-returns-to-scale assumption (speciﬁcally, f = fkk + fll) and
Fk = fk in the derivation. Equation (9) states simply that consumption and debt payments
(the right hand side) must equal total output minus equilibrium payments to capital plus
new debt. The problem can be simpliﬁed once we recognize that the combination of taxes
and a bond is equivalent to a complete set of state-contingent assets. In particular,































Conversely, any v that solves this problem is a solution to (3).
The complete markets equivalence results from the ability to transfer resources across
states within a period using capital taxes (keeping the average tax constant) plus the ability
to transfer resources across periods with the riskless bond. The combination is suﬃcient to
transfer resources across any two histories, as also shown in Judd (1992); Zhu (1992); Chari
et al. (1994). The scheme exploits the fact that capitalists are risk-neutral and that capital
is immobile for one period.
We characterize some key features of the optimal policy under commitment in the fol-
lowing proposition,
Proposition 1. Under commitment, for all zt,z′
t ∈ Z × Z, and for all zt−1 ∈ Zt−1, the
optimal ﬁscal policy has the following features: (i) it provides full intra-period insurance
to the workers, c({zt,zt−1}) = c({z′
t,zt−1}) ; (ii) it smooths consumption across periods
with discounting, U′(c(zt−1)) = β(1 + r∗)U′(c(zt,zt−1)); (iii) at the begining of every period,
the expected capital tax payments are zero and therefore capital is always at the ﬁrst best
level; and (iv) the amount of debt issued is independent of the current shock, b({zt,zt−1}) =
b({z′
t,zt−1}).
Results (i) and (ii) are standard outcomes of models with complete markets and full
commitment. Consumption is equalized across states of nature. Consumption trends up,
down, or is constant over time, depending on whether the rate of time discount is less than,
greater than, or equal to the world interest rate, respectively. Result (iii) follows from the
fact that capital only enters the budget constraint, so optimality requires maximizing total
output and not distorting investment; a well known result in the Ramsey taxation literature
(Judd (1985); Chamley (1986), and the stochastic version in Zhu (1992)). Chari et al. (1994)
obtain a similar result in a business cycle model. The small open economy assumption implies
that capital is inﬁnitely elastic ex ante and therefore that the zero-taxation of capital is
optimal at all dates and not just asymptotically. See Chari and Kehoe (1999) for a related
discussion. Result (iv) indicates how consumption smoothing is implemented using taxes
and debt. Taxation is used to transfer resources across states, and debt to transfer resources
across time. For example, when z is strictly an endowment shock or when there are only
two states, the optimal plan calls for counter-cyclical taxes, with capital taxed more in
10low endowment states compared to high endowment states. Note that this counter-cyclical
taxation does not distort investment. Whether z is an endowment or productivity shock, the
amount of debt issued however, is independent of the current shock in an i.i.d. environment.
The resulting ﬁscal deﬁcit is acyclical. The results in this section show that a government
with commitment will not amplify shocks through its tax policy. This holds independent of
the relation between β and r∗: even if the government were more impatient relative to the
market there will be no ampliﬁcation as long as the government can commit.
4 Optimal Taxation with Limited Commitment
Once the investment decision by the capitalists has been made, the government has an
incentive to tax capital as much as possible and redistribute the proceeds to the workers.
Similarly, a government has an incentive to default on its outstanding debt obligations. Thus,
the optimal tax and debt policy under commitment may not be dynamically consistent.
For the rest of this section we will assume that β(1 + r∗) ≤ 1, ensuring that the optimal
plan does not have unbounded asset positions.
We place an upper bound on the tax rate the government can set at any time:
Assumption 4 (A Maximum Tax Rate). The tax rate on proﬁts cannot be higher than
¯ τ = 1.
That is, the most the government can tax in any state is one-hundred percent of proﬁts.
The goal is to characterize the eﬃcient allocation of the game between the capitalists
and the government. We make the standard assumption that the external ﬁnancial markets
can commit to deny access in case of a deviation by the government:
Assumption 5. If the government ever deviates from the prescribed allocation on either
taxes or debt payments, the country will remain in ﬁnancial autarky forever; speciﬁcally the
government would not be able to issue debt or hold external assets.
As usual, eﬃcient allocations are implemented with the threat of the worst punishment
were the government to deviate on either taxes or debt payments. The worst outcome for
the government is ﬁnancial autarky coupled with a tax rate set to ¯ τ = 1, implying that no
investment will take place, kaut = 0. Note that given that after defaulting, the government
has no access to ﬁnancial markets forever, setting a tax rate equal to ¯ τ is an equilibrium
of the game between the capitalists and the government. Let Vaut denote the continuation








This assumes that the installed capital cannot be operated (or sold) by the government
upon deviation. Allowing the government to sell oﬀ or immediately consume capital after
deviation would not change the problem in a signiﬁcant manner. We assume that ¯ τ does
not bind along the equilibrium path, but places an upper bound on seized income if the
government deviates.1
Deﬁnition. Given an initial debt b(−1), an eﬃcient allocation is a sequence of functions
c(zt), b(zt), τ(zt), and k(zt) such that (3) is maximized, constraints (4)-(7) hold, and the
government at all histories prefers the continuation allocation to deviating and taxing capital










t−1))) + βVaut. (13)
Note that the payoﬀ after deviation is independent of the assets held by the government,
hence if the government defaults on its tax promises while holding positive assets, b(zt) < 0,
it will loose them. It is not relevant for an eﬃcient allocation to specify what happens to
the seized assets as long as they are lost to the government.
4.1 A Recursive Formulation
Let us denote by v the maximal amount of utility attainable to the government in an eﬃcient
allocation, given that it has issued an amount b ∈ b to the foreign ﬁnancial markets, where
b denotes the set of possible debt levels for which the constraint set is non-empty. We also
impose that the set b is bounded below (that is, assets have a ﬁnite upper bound). We
discuss below that this bound is not restrictive.
Let us denote by B the function such that (1 + r∗)b = B(v), for any b ∈ b. We
characterize the constrained eﬃcient allocations recursively. Histories are summarized by
promised expected discounted utility v for the government. We initially consider all v in a
closed interval [Vaut,Vmax], where Vmax is the value corresponding to the maximal asset level.
1Implicitly, the previous section assumed that ¯ τ is greater than the maximal tax rate under the Ramsey
plan (that is, the Ramsey plan is feasible without imposing negative post-tax proﬁts on capital).
12We assume Vmax ≥ U(F(¯ z,k∗))+βVaut. The right hand side of this inequality represents the
utility obtained by deviation if capital is at its ﬁrst best level and z is its maximum realization.
The lower bound Vaut follows immediately from the government’s lack of commitment. Once
we have deﬁned B(v) on [Vaut,Vmax], we will characterize and restrict attention to the subset
of [Vaut,Vmax] for which B(v) ∈ b.
We now show that eﬃcient allocations solve the following Bellman equation in which
the state variable is v, and the choice variables are the capital stock, state-contingent ﬂow
utility (u), and a state-contingent promised utility (ω) which will be next period’s state
variable. Let Ω deﬁne the space of possible choices, where ω(z) is restricted to [Vaut,Vmax],
and u(z) ≥ Umin and k ≥ 0.
Proposition 2. Let (c0(zt),k0(zt)) represent an eﬃcient allocation given initial debt b(−1) ∈
b. Let v represent the government’s utility under this allocation. Then (1+r∗)b(−1) = B(v),







F(z,k) − c(u(z)) − (r









q(z)[u(z) + βω(z)] (15)
U(F(z,k,l)) + βVaut ≤ u(z) + βω(z), ∀z
′ ∈ Z. (16)
The function c(u) denotes the consumption required to deliver utility u (i.e., U(c(u)) = u).
Moreover, the sequence (c0(zt),k0(zt)) satisﬁes the the recursive problem’s policy functions
(iterating from the initial v).
Conversely, let (c1(zt),k1(zt)) be a sequence generated by iterating the recursive problem’s
policy functions starting from an initial v for each shock history zt and B(v) ∈ b. Then,
(c1(zt),k1(zt)) is an eﬃcient allocation starting from an initial debt (1 + r∗)b(−1) = B(v)
The ﬁrst constraint (15) is the promise keeping constraint that ensures the government
enjoys (at least) the promised utility v. The second constraint (16) is the participation
constraint. This ensures that the government never has the incentive to deviate along the
equilibrium path. As discussed above, consumption during deviation is productive output
plus the endowment. The continuation value post deviation is Vaut deﬁned in (12). Note
that constraint (15) can be treated as an inequality because more utility can be oﬀered to
the country without violating previous participation constraints.
13Heuristically, an eﬃcient allocation sits on the (constrained) Pareto frontier deﬁned by the
government’s welfare and the bond holders’ welfare (subject to the requirement that capital is
always paid its opportunity cost). Note that the objective in the recursive problem represents
payments to the bond holders. Therefore, any point on the Pareto frontier represents a
solution to this problem. Conversely, as long as the promise keeping constraint (15) binds,
the solution to the recursive problem represents a constrained Pareto optimal allocation and
is therefore an eﬃcient allocation.
Our problem hence collapses to the problem of ﬁnding a constrained eﬃcient contract
between a risk-neutral foreigner (who can commit) and the government (who cannot commit).
Similar problems have been studied in the existing literature on dynamic contracts under lack
of commitment by Thomas and Worrall (1994) and Alburquerque and Hopenhayn (2004).
The operator deﬁned by (14) maps bounded functions into bounded functions. It also
satisﬁes Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions for a contraction. The operator maps the set of
continuous, non-increasing functions into itself. Standard arguments therefore imply that,
Lemma 2. The value function B(v) is non-increasing and continuous.
The participation constraints (16) are not convex due to the presence of U(F(z,k)) on
the left hand side of the inequality (16). So, to proceed with our characterization of the
optimum we make the following additional assumption that ensures concavity of the value
function.
Assumption 6. For all k ∈ [0,k∗]×[0,k∗] and for all z ∈ Z, Fkk(z,k)/Fk(z,k) is indepen-










This states that the production function is “concave enough” relative to the utility func-
tion. The ﬁrst term on the left hand side reﬂects the concavity of the utility function. As
utility becomes linear, the left hand side approaches zero. Similarly, the second term cap-
tures the inverse of the curvature of the production function. This term becomes large as the
production function becomes linear. This condition also implies that the local second order
conditions for the problem are satisﬁed. We provide one example to show that Assumption
6 does not require extreme preferences or technology. In particular, let U(c) = c1−σ/(1 − σ)
and F(z,k) = zkα + c0z. In this case, if α > 1/2 and c0 suﬃciently large (i.e., consumption
bounded below)2, then Assumption 6 is satisﬁed.
2Speciﬁcally, c0 ≥ max ασ/(1 − α) − 1,(1 − α)/(2α − 1) k∗α.
14We make one more assumption about preferences to ensure that positive investment is
sustainable even if promised utility is Vaut. Essentially, the government must be patient
enough that positive investment is sustainable at the lowest admissible promised value. A
suﬃcient condition is,
Assumption 7. β(1 + r∗) >
U′(F(¯ z,0))
U′(F(z,0)).
This condition is similar to one used by Krueger and Perri (2005) to rule out autarky as the
eﬃcient allocation in their analysis of endowment risk sharing with limited commitment.
In the appendix we prove that Assumptions 6 and 7 imply concavity of the foreigner’s
value function and that optimal policies are interior:
Proposition 3. Under the stated assumptions, (i) the value function B(v) is concave and
diﬀerentiable on [Vaut,Vmax]; (ii) There exists Vmin > Vaut, such that B′(v) = 0 for all v ∈
[Vaut,Vmin], promise keeping holds with strict equality for v ≥ Vmin, and b = [B(Vmin),B(Vmax)];
(iii) B(v) is strictly decreasing and strictly concave for v ∈ (Vmin,Vmax]; and (iv) for each
v ∈ [Vaut,Vmax], there exists an optimal (k,u(z),ω(z)) with k > 0, and such that there exists
non-negative multipliers (γ,λ(z)) that satisfy
c





















with −B′(v) = γ. Moreover, the policies are unique for v ∈ [Vmin,Vmax].
The ﬁrst statement of the proposition is that the value function is concave, which requires
Assumption 6. As discussed above, concavity (and diﬀerentiability) is not directly guaranteed
as the constraint set is not convex. Nevertheless, as shown in the appendix, the value function
is well behaved.
The second statement is that the promise keeping constraint does not bind in the neigh-
borhood of Vaut. That is, an eﬃcient allocation does not deliver utility below some threshold
Vmin > Vaut. This places a lower bound on v, which corresponds to the upper bound on b
inherent in b. There is no eﬃcient equilibrium that satisﬁes the constraints at a debt level
greater than B(Vmin). The function B(v) is depicted in Figure 1.
Statement (iii) strengthens statement (i) in that B(v) is strictly concave over the relevant
region. Despite the fact that the problem is not convex, statement (iv) indicates that there




Figure 1: This ﬁgure depicts the function B(v). The solid portion associated with v ≥ Vmin
is the Pareto frontier.
Let gi(v) denote the policies in an optimal plan for i = u(z′),ω(z′), and k, at state v.
We can immediately derive a number of properties of the optimal plan.
Proposition 4. In an optimal solution,
(i) For all v ∈ [Vaut,Vmax], gk(v) ≤ k∗;
(ii) For any v ∈ [Vaut,Vmax], if the participation constraints are slack for a subset Zo ⊂ Z,
then c(gu(z)(v)) is constant for all z ∈ Zo. Moreover, B′(gω(z)(v)) = β(1+r∗)B′(v) for
all z ∈ Zo;
(iii) If for some v ∈ [Vaut,Vmax] and (z′,z′′) ∈ Z × Z we have that gu(z′)(v)  = gu(z′′)(v) or
B′(gω(z′)(v))  = β(1 + r∗)B′(v), then gk(v) < k∗;
(iv) For any v ∈ [Vaut,Vmax], gω(z)(v) ≥ Vmin for all z.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition states that capital never exceeds the ﬁrst-best level.
This can be seen from (19) and the fact that multipliers are non-negative. Benhabib and
Rustichini (1997) show that in a deterministic closed economy model of capital taxation
without commitment, there are situations where capital is subsidized in the long run, pushing
capital above the ﬁrst-best level. In our case, with an open economy, such a situation never
arises. The second part states that the planner will always implement insurance across
states and across time to the extent possible. If two states have unequal consumption and
slack constraints, it is a strict improvement (due to risk aversion) to narrow the gap in
consumption.
16The third part of the proposition states that if the government fails to achieve perfect
insurance, it will also distort capital. To see the intuition for this result, suppose that
capital was at its ﬁrst-best level but consumption was not equalized across states. The
government could distort capital down slightly to relax the participation constraints. This
has a second-order eﬀect on total resources in the neighborhood of the ﬁrst-best capital
stock. However, the relaxation of the participation constraints allows the government to
improve insurance. Starting from an allocation without perfect insurance, this generates a
ﬁrst-order improvement in welfare. Finally, part (iv) states that after the ﬁrst period the
promise keeping constraint will hold with equality.
Deﬁne V ∗ = U(F(¯ z,k∗))+βVaut. Note that for any v ≥ V ∗ we have that gk(v) = k∗.3 And
that for v < V ∗ at least one participation constraint will be binding. The next proposition
further characterizes the eﬃcient allocation,
Proposition 5. In an optimal solution,
(i) gi(v) is single-valued and continuous for i = u(z′),ω(z′), and k, for all v ∈ [Vmin,Vmax];
(ii) gk(v) is non-decreasing in v, and strictly increasing for all v ∈ [Vmin,V ∗];
(iii) gω(z′)(v) and gu(z′)(v) are strictly increasing in v for all v ∈ [Vmin,Vmax];
(iv) gω(z1)(v) ≥ gω(z0)(v) if z1 > z0, and gω(¯ z)(v) > gω(z)(v) for all v ∈ [Vmin,V ∗].
Result (ii) states that capital is increasing in promised utility or is at the ﬁrst best. A
higher promised utility relaxes the participation constraint of the government, allowing for
more capital. The fact that k is increasing in promised utility implies a higher utility and
continuation value in each state to preserve government participation. That is, gω(z′)(v) and
gu(z′)(v) are strictly increasing in v on (Vmin,Vmax] for every realization z′ ∈ Z, which is
result (iii). Result (iv) states that future promised utility is nondecreasing in the realization
of the endowment. In other words, realizations of the shock generate a “spreading out” of
continuation values. If v < V ∗, then insurance across states is not perfect and there will be at
least one pair of states for which the inequality in (iv) is strict. The reason future promised
utility is relatively high following a high shock is directly due to limited commitment. The
strongest temptation to deviate from the optimal plan arises after receiving the highest
income shock. An optimal contract then accommodates such temptation by prescribing
higher domestic utility in case of a high income shock today. Consumption smoothing
implies that it is optimal to increase future utility as well as current utility, a result that is
achieved through a higher continuation value.
3If v ≥ U(F(¯ z,k∗,l)) + βVaut then, ignoring the participation constraints, it is optimal to set u(z) +
βw(z) = v for all z and k = k∗, which satisﬁes the participation constraints.
17The spreading out of continuation values and the fact that capital is increasing in
promised utility implies the following:
Proposition 6 (Procyclicality). In a constrained eﬃcient allocation, k(zt,zt−1) ≤ k(z′
t,zt−1)
for zt < z′
t. Also, if k(z,zt−1) < k⋆ then k(z,zt−1) < k(¯ z,zt−1).
This key proposition states that capital moves in a way that ampliﬁes and prolongs shocks
even in an environment in which shocks are i.i.d.. This pattern is reminiscent of emerging
market crises, as discussed in the introduction. In many instances the increased fear of
expropriation during a downturn generates a sharp drop in foreign investment, amplifying
the decline in output. Optimal tax policy in the presence of limited commitment is consistent
with such empirical regularities.
A common feature of models of insurance with limited commitment is that the partic-
ipation constraints tend to bind when the endowment is high. This results from the fact
that insurance calls for payments during booms and inﬂows during downturns. However, in
precisely an environment that emphasizes insurance, we show that distortions of investment
are greater during recessions because of the need to accumulate debt. This in turn makes
low taxes in the future more diﬃcult to sustain, depressing investment today.
4.2 Long Run Properties
If the government discounts the utility ﬂows at the world interest rate, from (18) it follows
that −B′(ω(z)) = −B′(v)+λ(z)/q(z). Given that the multipliers are non-negative and that
B is strictly concave on (Vmin,Vmax], this implies that v is weakly increasing over time and
strictly increasing when the participation constraint binds. If the initial v lies below V ∗, then
limt→∞ vt = V ∗. The fact that the continuation value policies, gw(z)(v), are strictly increasing
in v, implies that vt < V ∗ for all t. If the initial v lies above V ∗, then no participation
constraint ever binds, and v remains constant at its initial value. Monotonicity of v implies
that in the long run capital monotonically approaches the ﬁrst best. This result is a major
feature of the models of Thomas and Worrall (1994) and Alburquerque and Hopenhayn
(2004). In our environment, as in Alburquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), eventually enough
collateral, in the shape of foreign assets, is built up that the participation constraint relaxes
and the ﬁrst best capital level obtains. Therefore, the ampliﬁcation and persistence results
described above only hold along the transition, but not in the steady state.
An alternate situation is one in which the government is impatient relative to the world
interest rate. In this case, the government has a preference for early consumption. However,
bringing consumption forward tightens the participation constraints in the future, distorting
18investment. In fact, if the government is relatively impatient, promised utilities and capital
converge to a non-degenerate stationary distribution:
Proposition 7 (Impatience). If β(1+r∗) < 1, in a constrained optimal allocation, v and k
converge to unique, non-degenerate stationary distributions with respective supports that lie
strictly below V ∗ and k∗.
Impatience implies that the persistence and ampliﬁcation generated by limited commit-
ment is a permanent feature of the economy. It never escapes the range in which capital is
distorted. In fact, capital varies with the endowment shock in a manner that prolongs the












Panel A: β(1 + r∗) = 1 Panel B: β(1 + r∗) < 1
long run
Figure 2: This ﬁgure depicts policy functions for next period′s promised utility as a function of
the current promised utility. The shock takes two possible values. The top solid line represents
the policy if the shock is high and the bottom solid line represents the policy if the endowment
shock is low. The dashed ray is the 45 degree line. Panel A represents the case when β(1+r∗) =
1 and Panel B represents the case when β(1 + r∗) < 1.
To visualize how the economy converges to the stationary distribution, we plot the pol-
icy functions for continuation utility (gω(z′)(v)) in ﬁgure 2. We assume two states for the
endowment shock, ¯ z and z. Proposition 5 states that the policy function for the high shock
lies above the policy for the low shock (strictly above for any v < V ∗), and they are both
increasing in v. The policy functions lie strictly above the 45 degree line at Vaut because
gz(v) ≥ Vmin > Vaut by Proposition 4 part (iv).
Panel A assumes β(1+r∗) = 1 and panel B assumes β(1+r∗) < 1. Panel A indicates that
for v ≥ V ∗, the policy functions are equal (insurance across states) and on the 45 degree line
(smoothing across periods). For v < V ∗, the policy functions lie above the 45 degree line.
Therefore, starting from some v < V ∗, the promised utilities increase over time, approaching
19V ∗ in the limit. Panel B indicates that when β(1 + r∗) < 1, for any v ≥ V ∗, the policy
functions lie below the 45 degree line. To see this, note that from (18) and the envelope
condition,
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When all participation constraints are slack, β(1 + r∗) < 1 and strict concavity of the value
function imply that ω(z) < v. The policy functions intersect the 45 degree line at diﬀerent
points, which indicate the limits of the stationary distribution. The limiting distribution is
non-degenerate from Proposition 5. Within this distribution, a low shock will lower promised
utility and a high shock will raise it, reﬂecting that the government’s utility oscillates within
this range. Capital will converge to a corresponding non-degenerate distribution in which
k < k∗, with capital oscillating one-for-one with promised utility.
The level of capital and the level of debt (the inverse of promised utility) of the economy
are negatively correlated. The limited commitment of the government therefore generates
a debt over-hang eﬀect. Following high shocks the government accumulates assets. This
slackens the participation constraint of the government in the future, reducing the incentive
to deviate on taxes and therefore supporting higher investment. On the other hand, following
low shocks, the government accumulates debt which raises the incentive to deviate and lowers
investment. This mechanism diﬀers from that described in Sachs (1989) and Krugman (1988)
where a large level of debt reduces domestic investment because debt payments behave like
a tax on investment. In the earlier debt over-hang literature, debt relief can not only raise
investment but also be Pareto improving. In our environment, debt relief can beneﬁt the
government, but it is never a Pareto improvement, since the economy is at all points on
the constrained Pareto frontier. In addition, since the long-run distribution of investment is
unique, debt relief programs cannot have a long-run eﬀect on investment. The distortions in
investment arise from the lack of commitment of the government and impatience, which are
issues that cannot be resolved through debt relief.
Net foreign liabilities in our model can be deﬁned as debt plus foreign capital. The
change in net foreign assets, the current account, is typically counter-cyclical in the data,
particularly for emerging markets (see Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)). In our model, a positive
shock generates an inﬂow of foreign direct investment inducing a deterioration of the current
account. On the other hand, debt declines following a high shock, generating an improvement
of the current account. The net eﬀect on the current account is theoretically ambiguous, a
standard outcome in a model with transitory shocks.
While the government is providing insurance to the domestic agents, this does not neces-
sarily imply that government expenditures are higher during bad states. The model makes
20no distinction between private consumption and government provision of goods to the do-
mestic agents. Nevertheless, it is the case that the sum of consumption and government
expenditures is positively correlated with the shocks in the model, a fact consistent with the
data (see Kaminksy et al. (2004)).
5 Balanced Budget
In this section, we explore optimal taxation of foreign capital when the government does not
have access to debt. The purpose of this exercise is ﬁrstly to highlight the role of debt in
generating investment cycles. In the balanced budget case, i.i.d. shocks imply that there
is no state variable that varies over time and therefore optimal decisions are invariant to
the realized history of shocks. Consequently, while investment may be distorted, there will
be no cyclicality of investment. Secondly, we discuss circumstances under which budgetary
restrictions can alter the volatility of consumption and be welfare improving.
To be precise, this section alters the benchmark model through the following assumption:















Under the balanced budget assumption, we no longer have complete markets equivalence,
and therefore cannot rewrite the government’s problem as (10). However, constraints (4)




















t−1) = 0. (20)
where Ez is deﬁned to be the expectation over z.
As before, the fact that capitalists care only about the expected return to capital allows
the government to use taxes to transfer resources to workers across states. However, the
absence of bonds prevents inter-temporal transfers.















subject to (20). We characterize the optimal plan under commitment and a balanced budget
in the following proposition:
21Proposition 8. Under commitment and a balanced budget, the optimal policy: (i) Provides
full intra-period insurance to the workers, c({z,zt−1}) = c({z′,zt−1}) for all (z,z′) ∈ Z ×Z
and zt−1 ∈ Zt−1; (ii) At the beginning of every period, the expected capital tax payments are
zero and investment is ﬁrst best: Ez[τ({z,zt−1})Fk(k(zt−1),z)] = 0 and k(zt−1) = k∗.
This proposition diﬀers from the complete markets case of Proposition 1 in one important
respect. The optimal policy under a balanced budget insures workers across states within
a period but does not necessarily deliver the optimal level of consumption across periods.
Here consumption is equalized across periods. If β(1 + r) < 1, this is suboptimal. More
generally, the optimal allocation is independent of β.
As in the benchmark model with full commitment, insurance is accomplished without
distorting investment. That is, a balanced budget does not overturn the fact that the eﬃcient
policy sets expected capital taxes equal to zero. The government taxes capitalists and
transfers to workers in low-endowment states while transferring from workers to capitalists
in high-endowment states. However, the inability to borrow and save limits this insurance
to period-by-period insurance and not insurance over the entire path.
We now consider the case without commitment under a balanced budget constraint. A
balanced budget implies that payments to foreigners net of the opportunity cost of capital
is zero every period. That is, in the notation of the benchmark model, foreign utility B
is constrained to be zero. The punishment remains autarky, which is unaﬀected by the
requirement of a balanced budget and is independent of z since shocks are i.i.d. In the
absence of debt, the value function in the optimal program, V , is also independent of z.
The balanced budget problem can be written as directly maximizing the government’s










∗ + δ)k = 0, (22)
and
U(c(z
′)) + βV ≥ U(F(k,z
′)) + βVaut,∀z
′ ∈ Z. (23)
Given that there is no state variable in this problem, all policies are constant,
Proposition 9 (No ampliﬁcation). If the government is restricted to a balanced budget and
shocks are i.i.d., investment will be constant.
Investment may be distorted, but will be constant. With debt and an i.i.d. shock process,
investment co-moved with the cycle indeﬁnitely, as long as β < 1/(1 + r∗). Without debt,
22capital is constant when shocks are i.i.d. regardless of the relation between β and (1 + r∗).
In this sense, the balanced budget case highlights the role of debt in generating cyclical
investment.4
Another distinction the balanced budget assumption introduces is that depending on
β either the ﬁrst best is attainable immediately or it is never sustainable. With debt,
we have that as long as β ≥ 1/(1 + r∗), the ﬁrst best was achieved in the limit as time
approached inﬁnity. In the Appendix (see Lemma 14) we prove that there exists a β∗ ∈ (0,1)
such that for all β ≥ β∗ the full commitment solution is sustainable under the balanced
budget assumption, and it is not sustainable for β ∈ [0,β∗). This is a version of the folk
theorem. When the government is suﬃciently patient, the future beneﬁts of continuation
are suﬃciently important to sustain the ﬁrst best capital stock.
Proposition 10. Suppose β ≥ β∗. (i) Restricting the government to a balanced budget
achieves ﬁrst best capital and constant consumption. (ii) If ˆ β = 1/(1 + r∗) and β < ˆ β, then
restricting the government to a balanced budget improves the welfare of domestic agents.
Part (i) follows from an application of the folk theorem. The best allocation that can be
attained with a balanced budget is one that delivers ﬁrst best level of investment and constant
consumption. When the discount factor is high enough, such allocation is sustainable. When
ˆ β = 1/(1+r∗), this allocation is optimal from the perspective of domestic agents even when
borrowing is allowed. Hence (ii) directly follows.
Access to sovereign debt markets generates cyclical and distorted investment and volatile
consumption (proposition 4). If the government and the worker share the same discount
factor, i.e. the government is benevolent, this increase in volatility or distortion in invest-
ment is associated with a welfare improvement. Placing a balanced budget constraint on
a benevolent government can never be welfare improving. However, it can be argued, for
political economy reasons as in Amador (2004), that the government discounts the future at
a higher rate than the agents in the economy (β < ˆ β). If ˆ β = 1/(1 + r∗) > β ≥ β∗, then
imposing a balanced budget restriction will be welfare improving as well as generate greater
stability in output.
This result provides a rationale for why countries such as Chile and Brazil have placed
budgetary restrictions on their governments. More importantly, the analysis shows that this
type of policy may stabilize investment and consumption.
4Debt generates persistence endogenously in the case with i.i.d. shocks. To see the analogy between
having debt and having persistent shocks see Aguiar et al. (2006) where there is no debt, but shocks are
assumed to be persistent. The persistent shocks generate a comparable investment pattern as debt in the
neighborhood of the ﬁrst best capital stock.
236 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored the combination of impatience, limited commitment, and access
to borrowing and lending on foreign investment in a small open economy. The combination
implies an optimal capital tax and debt program which generates cyclical investment relative
to ﬁrst best capital. Under full commitment, capital is ﬁrst best regardless of the balanced
budget assumption. In an environment with limited commitment, debt prolongs the impact
of an i.i.d. endowment shock on future investment. If the government is impatient relative to
the world interest rate, capital oscillates indeﬁnitely, with low endowments associated with
low investment. Conversely, capital is stable in an environment in which governments run
balanced budgets and shocks are i.i.d. over time. Similarly, if the government is patient,
the ability to save allows convergence to the ﬁrst best capital stock. This highlights the role
debt, impatience, and limited commitment each play in amplifying investment cycles.
While it is clear that imposing a balanced budget stabilizes capital, it does not neces-
sarily improve welfare. Indeed, when the government is benevolent, imposing an additional
constraint on the government is never welfare improving, despite the increased income sta-
bility. The government borrows because domestic agents are impatient and are willing to
trade more consumption today in exchange for more volatility in the future. However, if
the government is impatient relative to the workers as well as the world interest rate, the
government will sub-optimally (from the workers’ perspective) trade away future stability
for increased current consumption. Depending on the magnitude of this distortion, this may
provide a rationale for imposing a balanced budget constraint, although it leaves open the
question of whether there is a more eﬃcient mechanism that allows some inter-temporal
smoothing, but not full access to debt markets.
24A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. As the objective functions are the same, we need to show that the constraint sets are
equivalent. Suppose that c(zt) and k(zt) satisfy constraints (4) through (7). Taking expec-
tations of both sides of equation (9) from the initial information set, we have (suppressing

















where we have used E [(1 − τ(zt))Fk(zt,k(zt−1)k(zt−1)] = E [(r∗ + δ)k(zt−1)]. We can solve















≥ (1 + r
∗)b(−1). (25)
To go the other way, suppose that c(zt) and k(zt) satisfy (11). Starting from b(−1),

















t−1) + (1 + r
∗)b(z
t−1). (26)
Given b(zt), c(zt) and k(zt), the τ(zt) solve equation (9) at each history. From (26), these
taxes satisfy (2). The derivation of (9) also veriﬁes that this choice is consistent with condi-
tions (4) through (6).
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. The proof of (i) through (iii) follows straightforwardly from the solution to (10). Let







t)) = λ, (27)
Fk(k(z
t),l) = r
∗ + δ. (28)
To prove (iv) we use the budget constraint, which holds with equality as λ > 0. Let ct
be consumption at time t, which is independent of the history of shocks by (ii). The budget






E [F(zs,k∗)] − (r∗ + δ)k∗




(1 + r∗)s−t. (29)
Note that the expectation of F(zs,k∗) is independent of history given that capital is constant
at k∗ and z is iid. Therefore, debt does not depend on the particular path of shocks.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The proposition holds by inverting the Pareto frontier. Speciﬁcally, the government’s
problem in recursive form with state variable b is
V (b) = max
c(z),b(z),k
E [u(c(z)) + βV (b(z))] (30)
subject to
E [c(z) + (1 + r
∗)b] = [F(z,k) − (r
∗ + δ)k + b(z)]
u(c(z)) + βV (b(z)) ≥ U(F(z,k)) + βVaut, ∀z ∈ Z
V (b(z)) ≥ Vaut, ∀z ∈ Z.
The ﬁrst constraint is the expected budget constraint, derived from (9), where we have
substituted in the ﬁrst order condition for foreign direct investment. The second and third
constraint ensure participation. Note that optimality ensures the budget constraint binds
with equality. Therefore, V (b) is strictly decreasing and has an inverse. By deﬁnition,
B(v)/(1+r∗) is this inverse, i.e. V (B(v)/(1 + r∗)) = v. Therefore, an allocation that solves
(30) must also solve (14). The converse is true as long as the promise keeping constraint (15)
binds. When (15) does not bind, B(v) is ﬂat as we increase v (see Figure 1). The domain
of v on which B(v) is ﬂat cannot be part of the Pareto frontier and B(v) does not solve
(30). This implies that if promise keeping does not bind at v, then there are no b such that
V (b) = v. That is, the constraint set of (30) is empty and b  ∈ b.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
This subsection characterizes the solution to the Bellman equation. The main technical
challenge stems from the fact that the constraint set is not convex. Nevertheless, under
Assumptions 6 and 7, we prove in this appendix that the value function is concave and
diﬀerentiable and the policy functions are interior, unique, and continuous. With these
26results in hand, Proposition 3 follows immediately.
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U(F(z,k,l)) + βVaut ≤ u(z) + βω(z), ∀z
′ ∈ Z.
Note that the operator deﬁned by (31) is a contraction. The value function is therefore the
unique ﬁxed point of this operator.
We begin by ﬁnding conditions under which the optimal k is strictly greater than zero.
Deﬁne Bn+1(v) = TBn(v) and deﬁne kn(v) as the corresponding optimal capital at promised
utility v. When we are operating on the ﬁxed point B(v) = TB(v), we denote the optimal
capital as k(v).
Lemma 3. If Bn′(Vaut) = 0, then kn(v) > 0 for all v ∈ [Vaut,Vmax]. Conversely, if kn(v) > 0
is optimal for all v, then Bn+1′(Vaut) = 0.
Proof. Suppose Bn′(Vaut) = 0, and, to generate a contradiction, kn(v) = 0 is optimal at some
v ∈ [Vaut,Vmax]. We show this cannot be optimal using a variational argument. Consider
increasing kn from zero by a small amount ∆k. This requires increasing u(z) + βω(z)
in all states for which the participation constraint binds. Let Z′ be the set of states for
which the participation constraint binds. For any z ∈ Z′, u(z) + βω(z) must be increased
by U′(F(z,0))Fk(z,0)∆k. If for some z ∈ Z′ we have ω(z) = Vaut, then by the premise
it is costless at the margin to increase ω(z) to satisfy the participation constraint. Let
Z′′ be the set of z ∈ Z′ such that ω(z) > Vaut. The binding participation constraint
implies u(z) < U(F(z,0)), ∀z ∈ Z′′. The marginal cost of increasing utility in state z
by the required amount is c′(u(z))U′(F(z,0))Fk(z,0)∆k. As c′(U(F(z,0))) = 1/U′(F(z,0)),
this equals Fk(z,0)∆k(c′(u(z))/c′(U(F(z,0))) < 1, where the last inequality follows from
the facts u(z) < U(F(z,0)) and the strict convexity of c(u). Therefore the net beneﬁt of












Fk(z,0) − (r ∗ +δ). (32)
As Fk(z,0) becomes arbitrarily big, this term is strictly positive. Therefore, k = 0 cannot
27be optimal.
To go the other way, assume that kn(Vaut) > 0. Then u(z)+βω(z) ≥ U(F(z,k))+βVaut
> U(F(z,0))+βVaut, where the last inequality follows from k > 0. Taking expectation over
z, this implies E [u(z) + βω(z)] > Vaut and promise keeping does not bind at Vaut. Therefore,
Bn+1(v) is constant at Vaut for small increases in v, implying that Bn+1(v) is diﬀerentiable
at Vaut from the right and the derivative is zero.
We now characterize the solution to (31) more fully. We begin by characterizing the ﬁrst
order conditions for a particular subset of functions. Deﬁne B as the set of bounded, concave,
diﬀerentiable functions deﬁned on [Vaut,Vmax] that satisfy B′(Vaut) = 0 and B′(Vmax) ≤
−β(1 + r∗)c′((1 − β)Vmax). This set is not empty.5 We start with this set as the solution
to (31) is always interior when B(v) ∈ B, as the next lemma demonstrates. Moreover, we
show below that the ﬁxed point of the operator lies in this set.
The next lemma states that if B(v) ∈ B, the solution is interior.
Lemma 4. For any v and Bn(v) ∈ B, there exist non-negative multipliers (γ,λ(z))) such
that an optimal solution (kn,u(z),ω(z)) of problem (31) has k∗ ≥ kn > 0 and satisﬁes:
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Proof. To simplify notation, in the proof we omit the n superscript on optimal capital.
Our problem satisﬁes the conditions stated in Luenberger (1969) Chapter 9 Theorem 1 (the
Generalized Kuhn-Tucker Theorem). The only technical issue is that any solution with k = 0
does not satisfy the required “regularity condition”, as Fk → ∞ as k → 0. However, Lemma
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¯ µ(z)(ω(z) − Vmax) + µ(z)(Vaut − ω(z)) + η(z)(Umin − u(z))
￿
,
5For example, consider B(v) = −A





28where (γ,λ(z), ¯ µ(z),µ(z),η(z)) are non-negative multipliers. The ﬁrst order conditions are:
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The lemma is proved once we show that η(z) = ¯ µ(z) = µ(z) = 0,∀z ∈ Z and that k ≤ k∗,
∀v ∈ [Vaut,Vmax].
The fact that k ≤ k∗ follows immediately from the ﬁrst order condition for capital and
the fact that right hand side of (38) is non-negative.
To see that η(z) = 0, note that if η(z) > 0, then u(z) = Umin. However, the Inada
condition, c′(Umin) = 0, and the ﬁrst order condition (36), imply that γ = λ(z) = η(z) = 0,
which contradicts η(z) > 0.
To see that µ = 0, recall that Bn′(Vaut) = 0. Equation (37) then requires µ = 0 (this
follows because µ > 0 implies µ = 0).
To show that ¯ µ = 0, suppose that instead ¯ µ(z) > 0 for some z ∈ Z. Then the constraint
binds and we have ω(z) = Vmax. The ﬁrst order condition for ω(z) implies −Bn′(ω(z)) <
β(1 + r∗)c′(u(z)). As Bn ∈ B, −Bn′(ω(z)) = −Bn′(Vmax) ≥ β(1 + r∗)c′((1 − β)Vmax).
Therefore, c′(u(z)) > c′((1 − β)Vmax). Convexity of c(.) implies
u(z) > (1 − β)Vmax. (39)
Therefore, u(z)+βω(z) > (1−β)Vmax+βVmax = Vmax. By deﬁnition, Vmax > U(F(¯ z,k∗))+
βVaut. Therefore, λ(z) = 0. This shows that ¯ µ(z) > 0 implies that λ(z) = 0.
As λ(z) = 0 and ω(z) = Vmax, (37) implies that
B
n′(Vmax) = −β(1 + r
∗)γ + (1 + r
∗)¯ µ(z). (40)
Now consider some z′ ∈ Z such that z′  = z. Concavity and the fact that ω(z′) ≤ Vmax, we
have Bn′(ω(z′)) ≥ Bn′(Vmax). Using (40), the ﬁrst order condition (37) evaluated at ω(z′)




n′(Vmax) + (1 + r
∗)(¯ µ(z
′) − ¯ µ(z)).
As ¯ µ(z) > 0, we have Bn′(ω(z′))−(1+r∗)¯ µ(z′)<Bn′(Vmax). Together, this implies ¯ µ(z′) > 0.
29As z′ was arbitrary, then if ¯ µ(z) > 0 for one z ∈ Z, we have ¯ µ(z) > 0 for all z ∈ Z. Therefore,
ω(z) = Vmax, ∀z ∈ Z. Moreover, we have λ(z) = 0 for all z ∈ Z, and so u(z) = ¯ u, ∀z ∈ Z for
some constant ¯ u. Now consider delivered utility: E [u(z) + βω(z)] = ¯ u + βVmax. For this to
be less than or equal to Vmax, we need ¯ u ≤ (1 − β)Vmax, which contradicts (39). Therefore,
µ(z) = 0, ∀z ∈ Z.
As the participation constraint is not convex, we can not directly infer how the multipliers
respond to changes in v by appealing to global concavity. Nevertheless, the next lemma uses
Assumption 6 to show how the multipliers on participation change as we vary v.
Lemma 5. Suppose that kn(v1) > kn(v0) for some (v0,v1), where we do not exclude the case
of v0 = v1. Then there exists at least one z ∈ Z such that λ(z|v1) < λ(z|v0). Moreover, if
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The ﬁrst order condition for capital implies H(ki,λi(z)) = 0, if (ki,λi(z)) constitute an
optimum.






















Fk is independent of z. Therefore, dividing both sides and using (41),
FkHk(k,λ(z))
Fkk
= H(k,λ(z)) + (r










Now consider any pair (ki,λi(z)) which constitute an optimum for some v, hence ki > 0. If
λi(z) > 0, then from the binding participation constraint, ui(z) < U(F(z,ki)) as ωi(z) > Vaut
(this last inequality is strict as Bn′(Vaut) = 0). The ﬁrst order conditions for ui(z) imply
that c′(ui(z)) ≥ λi(z)/q(z). Therefore 1/U′(F(z,ki)) > c′(ui(z))≥ λi(z)/q(z). Note that
1/U′(F(z,ki)) > λi(z)/q(z) if λi(z) = 0 given ki > 0. Therefore, for all k ≥ ki, we have
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for k ≥ ki. Therefore, as long as H(k,λi) ≥ 0, Hk(k,λi) < 0. Starting from H(ki,λi) = 0,
we therefore have H(kj,λi) < 0 for all kj > ki.
Now consider k1 ≡ kn(v1) > kn(v0) ≡ k0. From the above, we have H(k1,λ0) <
H(k0,λ0) = 0. Now suppose, to generate a contradiction and prove our ﬁrst claim, that
λ(z|v0) ≤ λ(z|v1), for all z ∈ Z. The ﬁrst order condition at k1 is

























where the middle inequality follows from the premise that λ(z|v0) ≤ λ(z|v1). But this
contradicts H(k1,λ0) < H(k0,λ0) = 0.
Now we show that if k0 = k1 = k, then λ0(z) = λ1(z) for all z ∈ Z. The two ﬁrst order
conditions can be diﬀerenced to give
E [(λ0(z) − λ1(z))g(z)] = 0, (43)
where g(z) = 1/q(z)U′(F(z,k))Fk(z,k) > 0. Now suppose, to generate a contradiction, there
is some z′ such that λ0(z′) > λ1(z′). Equation (43) and g(z) > 0,∀z ∈ Z implies that there
exists a z′′ such that λ0(z′′) < λ1(z′′). As λ0(z′) > 0, participation binds at z′ for u0(z′) and
therefore (given equal k) we have u1(z′) ≥ u0(z′). The ﬁrst order conditions for u(z′) then
imply γ0 + λ0(z′)/q(z′) ≤ γ1 + λ1(z′)/q(z′). Given λ0(z′) > λ1(z′), we require γ0 < γ1. Now
consider z′′, for which λ0(z′′) < λ1(z′′). This implies λ0(z′′)/q(z′′) + γ0 < λ1(z′′)/q(z′′) + γ1,
or u0(z′′) < u1(z′′). However, this implies participation is slack at u1(z′′), contradicting
λ1(z′′) > λ0(z′′).
The following lemma deﬁnes an useful property of the new value function.
Lemma 6. Deﬁne V
n+1
min to be the highest value such that Bn+1(v) = Bn+1(Vaut) for all
v < V
n+1
min . Then the promise keeping constraint will be binding for all v ≥ V
n+1
min .
Proof. Note that if the promise keeping constraint is slack for some v0, then Bn+1(v) =
Bn+1(v0) for all v < v0 (lowering the promised value cannot be worse). Then it follows that
31the promise keeping is binding for all v > V
n+1
min . It is also binding at V
n+1
min because if it
were not, that is the promise keeping constraint is slack at V
n+1
min , then a small increase in
the promised value has to deliver the same utility B(V
n+1
min ), as the same allocation satisfy
all the constraints, a contradiction of the deﬁnition of V
n+1
min .
We can show that the policies are unique and continuous for all v ∈ [V
n+1
min ,Vmax].
Lemma 7. The optimal policy (kn(v),u(z|v),ω(z|v)) and multipliers (γ(v),λ(z|v)) of prob-
lem (31) for Bn(v) ∈ B are unique and continuous in v for v ∈ [V
n+1
min ,Vmax].
Proof. Note that we are considering the range of v such that the promise keeping binds.
For uniqueness, suppose that (kn
0,u0(z),ω0(z)) and (kn
1,u1(z),ω1(z)) both are optimal
allocations given some v. Let the associated multipliers be denoted by corresponding sub-
scripts. Note that for ﬁxed k, the constraint set is convex and the objective strictly concave,
in which case the optimal policy is unique. Therefore, if kn
0 = kn
1, the remaining poli-
cies are unique. So suppose kn
1 > kn
0. Let Z′ ⊆ Z be the set of z such that λ0(z) > 0.
For these z, participation binds at kn
0 and so u1(z) + βω1(z) ≥ U(F(z,k1)) + βVaut >
U(F(z,k0)) + βVaut = u0(z) + βω0(z). As c′(u(z)) = −β(1 + r∗)Bn′(ω(z)) and both sides
are strictly convex on the relevant domain, this implies u1(z) > u0(z) ∀z ∈ Z′. For equality
of delivered utility (i.e. Pareto optimality), we must have at least one ˜ z  ∈ Z′ such that
u1(˜ z)+βω1(˜ z) < u0(˜ z)+βω0(˜ z). This implies γ1 ≤ c′(u1(˜ z)) < c′(u0(˜ z)) = γ0, where the last
equality follows from λ(˜ z) = 0 for ˜ z  ∈ Z′. As c′(u1(z)) > c′(u0(z)) for z ∈ Z′, γ1 < γ0 and
the ﬁrst order condition for u(z) imply that λ1(z) > λ0(z) ∀z ∈ Z′. As λ0(z) = 0 for z  ∈ Z′,
we have λ1(z) ≥ λ0(z) for all z ∈ Z and strictly greater for at least one z. By Lemma 5,
this is inconsistent with kn
1 > kn
0. Therefore the optimal policy is unique. From Lemma 5,
uniqueness of capital implies that λ(z) are unique. The uniqueness of γ then follows from
the ﬁrst order conditions and the uniqueness of policies.
For continuity, consider a small change in v. As the promise keeping constraint binds on
the stated domain, this induces a small change in E [u(z|v) + βω(z|v)]. If u(z|v) jumps up
or down discretely, then there must be an oﬀsetting discrete change in ω(z|v) or a discrete
change in u(z′|v)+βω(z′|v) for z′  = z. We can rule out a discrete oﬀsetting change in ω(z|v)
as the ﬁrst order conditions imply c′(u(z|v)) = −β(1 + r∗)Bn′(ω(z|v)), and both sides are
convex. The same reasoning (and the fact that Bn′(v) is continuous) implies that if ω(z′|v)
changes discretely, then so does u(z′|v), and vice versa. We therefore can focus on a discrete
change in u(z′|v) as the oﬀ-setting response to a discrete change in u(z|v). Suppose that
in response to the small change in v, we label z and z′ so that u(z|v) increases discretely
and u(z′|v) falls discretely. From the ﬁrst order conditions, this requires a discrete increase
in λ(z|v) and a discrete decrease in λ(z′|v). A discrete decrease in λ(z′|v) requires that
32before the change in v we had λ(z′|v) > 0 and the participation constraint was binding. The
discrete decline in u(z′|v) (and the associated decline in ω(z′|v)) requires a discrete decline
in capital to maintain participation. However, the increase in u(z|v) means that after the
change, λ(z|v) = 0. This rules out that λ(z|v) increased discretely. This implies that the
optimal policy for u(z|v) is continuous for all z ∈ Z, and by extension the optimal policy for
ω(z|v) is continuous.
To show that this implies continuity of kn(v), consider a discontinuous movement of
kn(v) for a small change in v. If kn(v) falls discretely, then continuity of u(z|v) + βω(z|v)
implies that all participation constraints are slack, which is only consistent with the new
kn = k∗, which contradicts a discrete drop in capital as it is never optimal for kn(v) > k∗. If
capital increases discontinuously, then all participation constraints must have been slack at
the initial capital. This implies the initial capital was k∗, which contradicts the optimality
of a discrete increase.
The continuity of the policy functions implies continuity of the multipliers. To see this,
a discrete change in γ(v) requires a discontinuous change in all λ(z|v) of the opposite sign.
However, this is not consistent with a continuous change in capital. Therefore, γ(v) is
continuous. The continuity of λ(z|v) then follows from the continuity of u(z|v), γ(v) and
the ﬁrst order condition c′(u(z|v)) = γ(v) +
λ(z|v)
q(z) .
The next lemma states that if Bn(v) ∈ B, then Bn+1 is diﬀerentiable.
Lemma 8. Suppose Bn ∈ B. Then Bn+1 = TBn is diﬀerentiable and the envelope condition
applies, that is Bn+1′(v) = −γ(v).
Proof. For any point v ∈ [Vaut,Vmax] let k(v) be the optimal capital given Bn. Consider max-
imizing the objective function subject to promise keeping but with the following alternative
set of participation constraints:
u(z) + βω(z) ≥ U(F(z,k0)) + U
′(F(z,k0))Fk(z,k0)(k − k0) + βVaut. (44)
Note that concavity of U and F imply that
U(F(z,k)) ≤ U(F(z,k0)) + U
′(F(z,k0))Fk(z,k0)(k − k0), (45)
so this participation constraint is “tighter” than the original when k0 = k(v). Let ˜ Bn+1(v|k0)
be the solution to this problem and Bn+1(v) the solution to our original problem. Note
that when k0 = k(v), ˜ Bn+1(v|k(v)) = Bn+1(v) and the allocations and multipliers are
33the same in the two problems.6 Note also that this alternative problem maximizes a
strictly concave objective function subject to convex constraints. Standard arguments im-
ply that ˜ Bn+1(v|k0) is concave and diﬀerentiable with respect to v, and ˜ Bn+1′(v|k(v)) =
−γ(v). We also have that for any given k0, ˜ Bn+1(v|k0) ≤ Bn+1(v), ∀v, where the in-
equality follows from the fact that the alternative participation constraints are tighter.
Hence, Bn+1(v) = maxk0 ˜ Bn+1(v|k0). Note that ˜ Bn+1′(v|k(v)) = −γ(v) is continuous in
v by Lemma 7. By Theorem 2 of Milgrom and Segal (2002), we can express Bn+1(v) as
Bn+1(v) = Bn+1(v0) +
R v
v0
˜ Bn+1′(˜ v|k(˜ v))d˜ v. Hence continuity of γ(v) implies that Bn+1(v) is
diﬀerentiable and Bn+1′(v) = ˜ Bn+1′(v,k(v)) = −γ(v). To see that Theorem 2 applies, let
f(x,t) = ˜ Bn+1(t|k(x)). Note then that Bn+1(t) = f(t,t) = maxx f(x,t). Now, as argued
above, f(x,t) is diﬀerentiable with respect to t for all x. The derivative ft(x,t) is bounded
above by 0, and for any particular z, we have that ˜ Bn+1′(v,k0) ≥ −c′(˜ u(z|v,k0)) where
˜ u(z|v,k0) is the optimum u(z) given the modiﬁed participation constraints. We can then
show that ˜ u(z|v,k0) is bounded above for all admissible (k0,v) and hence ˜ Bn+1′ is bounded.
So |ft(x,t)| ≤ M for positive M, and the assumptions of Milgrom and Segal (2002), Theorem
2 are satisﬁed.
The next two lemmas state that we can use the operator T to iterate on the set B to
converge to a concave ﬁxed point.
Lemma 9. Suppose Bn ∈ B. Then Bn+1(v) = TBn(v) is concave for all [Vaut,Vmax], and
strictly concave on [V
n+1
min ,Vmax].
Proof. First note that if Bn+1′(v0) = 0 for some v0, then Bn+1′(v) = 0 for all v < v0 (if
the participation constraint is not binding at v0, it will not be binding for lower promises).
Hence Bn+1(v) is strictly decreasing for all v ∈ [V
n+1
min ,Vmax], by deﬁnition of V
n+1
min . Note
also that Bn+1(v) is constant for all v ∈ [Vaut,V
n+1
min ]. The fact that Bn+1(v) is concave when
it is ﬂat is trivially true. Consider v1 > v0 ≥ V
n+1
min . Let γ1 and γ0 be the corresponding
multipliers on the respective promise keeping constraints. From Lemma 8, strict concavity
follows if γ1 > γ0. To generate a contradiction, suppose γ1 ≤ γ0. If kn(v1) > kn(v0),
then from Lemma 5, there exists z′ ∈ Z such that λ(z′|v1) < λ(z′|v0). The ﬁrst order
conditions then imply u(z′|v1) < u(z′|v0) and ω(z′|v1) < ω(z′|v0). As kn(v1) > kn(v0), this
implies λ(z′|v0) = 0, contradicting the premise that λ(z′|v1) < λ(z′|v0). Now suppose that
kn(v1) ≤ kn(v0). As v1 > v0 and promise keeping binds at v0, there exists a z′′ ∈ Z such that
u(z′′|v1) > u(z′′|v0) and ω(z′′|v1) > ω(z′′|v0). As kn(v1) ≤ kn(v0), this implies λ(z′′|v1) = 0.
6The allocations and multipliers must be the same as the ﬁrst order conditions are the same at k0 and
Lemma 7 implies these conditions have a unique solution.
34However, u(z′′|v1) > u(z′′|v0) then implies that γ1 = c′(u(z′′|v1)) > c′(u(z′′|v0)) ≥ γ0, a
contradiction of the premise that γ1 ≤ γ0.
Lemma 10. For any bounded Bn(v), not necessarily in B, with Bn′(Vaut) = 0, and Bn+1(v) ≡
TBn(v) concave, then Bn+1(v) ∈ B.
Proof. Note that Bn′(Vaut) = 0 implies that capital is interior by Lemma 3. Concavity and
the Benveniste-Scheinkman Theorem implies that Bn+1(v) is diﬀerentiable on the interior.
The fact that Bn+1′(Vaut) = 0 follows from Lemma 3. So for Bn+1 to lie in B we just
need to show that Bn+1′(Vmax) ≤ −β(1 + r∗)c′((1 − β)Vmax). At v = Vmax, we have that
Vmax ≤ E [u(z) + βω(z)] ≤ E[u(z)]+βVmax, where the second inequality follows from ω(z) ≤
Vmax. Therefore, there exists at least one z0 ∈ Z such that u(z0) ≥ (1 − β)Vmax. Now we
have that Bn+1′(Vmax) ≤ −c′(u(z)) for all z, hence Bn+1′(Vmax) ≤ −c′((1 − β)Vmax) ≤
−β(1 + r∗)c′((1 − β)Vmax) given that β(1 + r∗) ≤ 1.
Corollary 1. If Bn(v) ∈ B, then Bn+1 = TBn ∈ B.
Proof. From Lemma 9, Bn+1 is concave. Then Lemma 10 implies that Bn+1 ∈ B.
Lemma 11. The (unique) ﬁxed point of T is concave.
Proof. Let Bn+1(v) = TBn = T nB0. Start with B0(v) ∈ B. From the Corollary 1, Bn+1(v) ∈
B if Bn(v) ∈ B. Therefore, Bn, n = 1,2,.., is a sequence in B. As T is a contraction, this
sequence converges to a unique limit. Moreover, as B is a subset of the set of concave,
bounded functions, which is closed, the limit is concave.
The next lemma uses Assumption 7, to show that the optimal k will always be strictly
greater than zero.
Lemma 12. At the optimum, k(v) > 0 for all v ∈ [Vaut,Vmax] and B′(Vaut) = 0.
Proof. If k(Vaut) > 0, then k(v) > 0 for all v ∈ [Vaut,Vmax]. To see this, note that if k > 0 is
optimal at Vaut, then the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 3 implies that the promise
keeping is slack at Vaut and B′(Vaut) = 0. The same lemma applied to the ﬁxed point would
then imply that k > 0 is optimal at all v ∈ [Vaut,Vmax]. Therefore it suﬃces to show that
k = 0 is not optimal at Vaut.
Suppose k = 0 were optimal at Vaut. From Lemma 3, this implies that promise keeping
binds at Vaut, that is E [u(z) + βω(z)] = Vaut≡ E [U(F(z,0)) + βVaut]. As u(z) + βω(z) ≥
U(F(z,0))+βVaut, ∀z ∈ Z, this implies that u(z)+βω(z) = U(F(z,0))+βVaut, ∀z ∈ Z. As
ω(z) ≥ Vaut, this requires u(z) ≤ U(F(z,0)) ∀z ∈ Z. Now suppose that u(z) < U(F(z,0))
for some z. Then, along the lines of the proof of Lemma 3, a slight increase in k requires
35an increase of Ec′(u(z′))U′(F(z′,0))Fk(z′,0) < EFk(z′,0) in outlays. This implies that a
small increase in k is optimal as Fk(z,0) becomes large. Therefore, optimal k = 0 requires
u(z) = U(F(z,0)), ∀z ∈ Z, which in turn implies ω(z) = Vaut and Vaut is a stationary point
(i.e. if v = Vaut today, v = Vaut next period regardless of the shock).
Now consider reducing u(¯ z) at the margin by a small amount ∆. This saves c′(U(F(¯ z,0)))∆
in current costs if ¯ z is realized. To maintain participation, ω(¯ z) must be increased by
β−1∆. One way (although perhaps not the optimal way) of delivering on this increase in
promised utility is to increase the next period’s u(z) by ∆
βq(z). This increases expected util-
ity by β−1∆. This has an expected cost of
c′(U(F(z,0)))∆
β(1+r∗) in current units. By Assumption
7,
c′(U(F(z,0)))
β(1+r∗) < c′(U(F(¯ z,0))), making such a variation an improvement over the original
allocation. Therefore, k = 0 was not optimal.
From Lemma 3, k(v) > 0 implies that B′(Vaut) = 0.
Next we show that any ﬁxed point of T is a member of B.
Lemma 13. The ﬁxed point of T is a member of B.
Proof. Let B(v) denote the ﬁxed point. From Lemma 11, we know B(v) is concave. From
Lemma 12 we have B′(Vaut) = 0. Lemma 10 then implies that B(v) ∈ B.
We now are ready to prove Proposition 3.
Proof. Part (i) follows from the fact that B(v) ∈ B.
For part (ii) and (iii), recall that k > 0 given that B(v) ∈ B and Lemma 3. Hence at
v = Vaut, we have
u(z) + βω(z) ≥ U(F(z,k)) + βVaut > U(F(z,0)) + βVaut. (46)




q(z)(u(z) + βω(z)) >
X
z∈Z
q(z)(U(F(z,0)) + βVaut) = Vaut (47)
So B(v) = B(Vaut) for all v ∈ [Vaut,Vmin] and hence B′(v) = 0 in that domain. Note
that this implies that v < Vmin is not on the Pareto frontier. Lemma 6 implies that the
promise keeping is holding with equality for any v ≥ Vmin. Concavity follows from Lemma
9. Therefore, B(v) is strictly decreasing for v ∈ [Vmin,Vmax], generating the Pareto frontier.
This implies that b = [B(Vmin),B(Vmax)]. Part (iv) follows from Lemmas 4 and 7.
36A.4 Proof of Propositions 4 and 5
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. Part (i) follows from the ﬁrst order conditions for capital. Part (ii) follows from the
ﬁrst order conditions and the envelope condition, as well as the strict convexity of c(u). For
part (iii), note that the ﬁrst order conditions imply that if utility varies across states or if
B′(ω(z)) varies across states, then at least one λ(z) > 0, hence the ﬁrst order condition for
capital implies that capital is below the ﬁrst best. Part (iv) then follows from the ﬁrst order
condition and the deﬁnition of Vmin.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof. Recall that a constrained eﬃcient equilibrium requires v ∈ [Vmin,Vmax], as v < Vmin
are not part of the Pareto frontier. Part (i) follows directly from Lemma 7. For (ii), let
v0 > v1. For the remainder of the proof, let ki = gk(vi), i = 0,1. To generate a contradiction,
suppose k0 < k1. From Lemma 5, there exists at least one z ∈ Z, call it z1, such that
λ(z1|v0) > λ(z1|v1). (48)
Concavity of B(v) implies γ(v0) ≥ γ(v1). The ﬁrst order conditions then require gω(z1)(v0) ≥
gω(z1)(v1) and gu(z1)(v0) > gu(z1)(v1). This implies that the total utility delivered in z1 (that
is, u(z1) + βω(z1)) is greater following v0 than v1. The premise of the contradiction is that
k0 < k1, which implies that the participation constraint is easier to satisfy. Therefore,
the participation constraint in state z1 following (v0) must be slack. This implies that
0 = λ(z1|v0) ≤ λ(z1|v1), which is a contradiction of (48).
We now rule out k0 = k1 if k1 < k∗. From Lemma 5, k1 = k0 requires λ(z|v0) = λ(z|v1),
for all z ∈ Z. By concavity, γ1 > γ0. Therefore, u(z) and ω(z) is strictly greater in all z ∈ Z
following v1 than following v0. This implies that λ(z|v1) = 0, ∀z ∈ Z, which implies k1 = k∗,
a contradiction.
For (iii), the fact that −B′(gω(z)(v)) = β(1+r∗)c′(gu(z)) and concavity ensures that gω(z)
moves one-for-one with gu(z). (17) and the envelope condition imply c′(gu(z)) = −B′(v)+
λ(z)
q(z .
Strict concavity of B implies that B′(v) is strictly increasing. If λ(z) = 0, this proves the
claim as λ(z) cannot fall below zero. If λ(z) > 0, then the binding participation constraint
and the fact that k is strictly increasing in v requires that u(z)+βω(z) increases a v increases.
For (iv), we ﬁrst show that promised continuation values are non-decreasing in z. The fact
that U(F(z,k)) is strictly increasing in z implies that either u(z1)+βω(z1) > u(z0)+βω(z0),
or that λ(z0) = 0. If the former, the fact that c′(u(z)) = β(1+r)B′(ω(z)) and strict convexity
37of c(u), imply that u(z1)+βω(z1) > u(z0)+βω(z0) requires ω(z1) ≥ ω(z0). In the case that
λ(z0) = 0, we have that λ(z1) ≥ λ(z0) and (18) plus the concavity of B gives the result.
We now show that gω(¯ z)(v) > gω(z)(v) for v < V ∗. Consider the set Z′ ⊆ Z such that
λ(z) > 0 if z ∈ Z′. As v < V ∗ there exists at least one z such that λ(z) > 0, and therefore
Z′ is not empty. As U(F(z,k))+βVaut is strictly increasing in z, then so is u(z)+βω(z) for
z ∈ Z′. As c′(u(z)) = −B′(ω(z)) and the strict concavity of B(v) on the relevant domain, we
have that ω(z) is strictly increasing in z for z ∈ Z′. Moreover, the ﬁrst order condition for
ω(z) implies that ω(z′) > ω(z) if z′ ∈ Z and z ∈ Z − Z′. This implies that the distribution
of ω(z) is not a single point. The fact that ω(z) is non-decreasing in z over the entire set Z
then implies the result.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. We focus on the invariant distribution of v. The invariant distribution of k follows
immediately from the policy function gk(v). The policy function gω(z′)(v) and the transition
function for z induce a ﬁrst-order Markov process for v. As gω(z′)(v) is continuous, the
transition function has the Feller property (see Stokey and Lucas (1989), Exercise 8.10).
Theorem 12.10 of Stokey and Lucas (1989) implies that there exists an invariant distribution.
To show that any invariant distribution is bounded above by V ∗: As β(1 + r∗) < 1 and
the participation constraints are slack at V ∗ by deﬁnition, we have gω(z′)(V ∗) < V ∗,∀z′ ∈ Z.
As gω(z′)(v) is monotonic in v, then gω(z′)(v) < V ∗,∀v ∈ [Vaut,V ∗]. This proves that the
invariant distribution lies below V ∗. As gk(v) is a function of v, the invariant distribution
of v generates a corresponding distribution for k. As gk(v) is increasing in v for v < V ∗ and
gk(V ∗) = k∗, this implies that invariant distribution of k lies below k∗.
The fact that the invariant distribution is non-degenerate follows from the above fact
that elements of the invariant distribution are less than V ∗ and Proposition 5.
To show that the invariant distribution is unique, we prove that there exists a “mixing
point” ˜ v and an N ≥ 1 such that there is strictly positive probability that v ≥ ˜ v and strictly
positive probability v ≤ ˜ v after N periods starting from any point in [Vmin,Vmax]. The result
then follows from Theorem 12.12 of Stokey and Lucas (1989). Deﬁne v to be the highest
v ∈ [Vaut,Vmax] such that gω(z)(v) = v. That is, v is the highest v at which the policy function
for ω(z) crosses the 45 degree line. Such a v exists as the policy function is continuous and
maps [Vaut,Vmax] into itself and from (ii) we know v < V ∗. Deﬁne ¯ v to be the smallest v
such that gω(¯ z)(v) = v, that is the smallest ﬁxed point of the policy function for ¯ z. We now
show that ¯ v > v: any ﬁxed point of the policy function for the highest shock is to the right
of v. Suppose not. From Proposition 5, we know that ¯ v  = v. Therefore, the premise implies
38that ¯ v < v. The fact that k(v) is strictly increasing in v for v < V ∗ implies that k(v) > k(¯ v).
From Lemma (5), this implies that for at least one z′ ∈ Z we have λ(z′|¯ v) > λ(z′|v). Now at















By concavity and v > ¯ v, this implies λ(z|v)/q(z) ≥ λ(¯ z|¯ v)/q(¯ z). The fact that u(z) is
increasing in z (Proposition 5) then implies that λ(z|v)/q(z) are increasing in z and therefore
λ(z|v)/q(z) ≥ λ(z|v)/q(z) and λ(¯ z|¯ v)q(¯ z) ≥ λ(z|¯ v)/q(z), for all z ∈ Z. This implies that
λ(z|v) ≥ λ(z|¯ v), ∀z ∈ Z, which contradicts the existence of a z′ such that λ(z′|¯ v) < λ(z′|v).
Therefore, ¯ v > v. Select ˜ v to the midpoint of the interval [v, ¯ v]. Iterating on the highest
shock policy function starting from any v, a long enough but ﬁnite sequence of high shocks
will result in v ≥ ˜ v. Similarly, using the lowest shock policy function and starting from any
v, a ﬁnite sequence of low shocks will bring v below ˜ v. Therefore, ˜ v is a mixing point, and
a unique stationary distribution follows.
A.6 Section 5 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 8:
























E [zt|zt−1] + F (k (zt−1),l)
−E [c(zt)|zt−1] − (r∗ + δ)k(zt−1)
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where zt−1 evaluated at t = 0 refers to the initial information set. The ﬁrst-order conditions






















where the ﬁrst condition implies that c({zt,zt−1}) = c({z′
t,zt−1}) for all (zt,z′
t) ∈ Zt × Zt
and the second condition implies that E [τ (zt)|zt−1] = 0.
39Lemma 14. [A folk theorem] There exists a β∗ ∈ (0,1) such that for all β ≥ β∗ the full
commitment, balanced budget solution is sustainable, and it is not sustainable for β ∈ [0,β∗).
Proof. Note that the full commitment and the deviation allocations are independent of the
value of β. Let c∗(zt−1) denote consumption at time t under commitment, conditional on
zt−1. Deﬁne the diﬀerence in the present discounted value of utility under the commitment







Note that c∗(zt−1) > E[zt|zt−1]. This is so because k∗ > 0 and the fact that c∗ is the optimal
plan. Therefore, the expected value of the term in brackets is strictly positive. Therefore,
∆(z,β) is strictly increase in β, is equal to zero when β = 0 and approaches inﬁnity as β
approaches one. We can write the participation constraints at the commitment allocation as
U(c
∗(zt−1)) − U(F(k
∗,l,zt)) ≥ −∆(zt,β). (49)
As the right-hand side of (49) is strictly increasing in β, and the left-hand side does not vary
with β, if this constraint is satisﬁed at β, then it is satisﬁed at any β′ > β. When β = 0,
the right-hand side of (49) is zero and the constraint will not hold for some z. When β → 1,
the right-hand side of (49) approaches minus inﬁnity, implying there is a β∗ < 1 for which
all the participation constraints are satisﬁed at the full commitment allocation for β ≥ β∗,
and at least one constraint is violated at the full commitment allocation for β < β∗.
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